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Should I Stay or Should I Go? Geographic 
Entrepreneurial Choices in Brazilian 
Franchising*
by Eugênio J. S. Bitti, Muriel Fadairo, Cintya Lanchimba, and 
Vivian Lara dos Santos Silva
In the broad empirical literature on franchising, performance outcomes of location decisions 
appear to be a largely forgotten issue. Yet franchising represents a rich context to study the impact 
of geographic entrepreneurial choices. Addressing this “blank spot” in the literature, we deal with 
the following question: Is it better for a chain to stay in the same geographic area, or to expand 
via distant franchised units? Our econometric estimations on new and unique Brazilian panel 
data show that spatial agglomeration of chain outlets leads to higher performance, suggesting 
that agglomeration gains outweigh cannibalization and spatial monopoly effects.
Introduction
Location has long been clearly understood 
to be a major entrepreneurial choice, and a 
key determinant of firm performance in re-
tailing (Applebaum 1966; Cliquet 1998; Fox, 
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Postreal, and McLaughlin 2007; Jones and 
Simmons 1987); Streed and Cliquet 2013). 
However, locational choice has received rather 
little attention in the franchising literature, 
as underlined by Ehrmann and Meiseberg 
(2011). El Akremi, Perrigot, and Piot-Lepetit 
(2015) emphasize that although performance 
is the focus of many studies in the franchis-
ing field, the performance outcomes of loca-
tion choices seems to be a forgotten issue. 
All things considered, discussions on the 
locational aspects of franchising seem short-
sighted, addressing the geographic dimen-
sion only insofar as it is a means to evaluate 
monitoring costs between franchisors and the 
outlets of franchise chains (e.g., Combs and 
Ketchen 2003; Norton 1988; Perryman and 
Combs 2012).
Yet franchising represents a rich context 
within which to study the impact of geographic 
entrepreneurial choices. In a franchise chain, 
the franchisor develops a brand and a business 
concept, which is then operated by indepen-
dent outlets—the franchisees. The geographic 
potential for entrepreneurial opportunities 
motivates the choice of where to locate new 
outlets.
Thus, the chain development depends on 
geographical expansion choices. The spa-
tial exploitation of a viable franchise con-
cept turns on the central following issue: Is 
it better for a chain to stay in the same geo-
graphic area, or to expand somewhere else 
via franchised units distant from one another? 
The main goal of our paper is to address this 
issue. We discuss the location choices of fran-
chise chains in Brazil and provide evidence 
on performance outcomes. The geographi-
cal entrepreneurial choices may encompass 
internationalization decisions. In this paper, 
we focus on geographical choices at local/na-
tional level.
Our work is related to three empirical 
research areas: location choices and entre-
preneurship, location choices and franchis-
ing, and location effects on performance. 
For each of these, in Appendix 1, we pres-
ent the focus, representative references, and 
the main results. As remarked by Combes 
and Gobillon (2015), the literature on loca-
tion choices and entrepreneurship is “bur-
geoning,” dealing mainly with the location 
choices of foreign direct investments, and 
of new entrepreneurs. In the literature on 
franchise data, the geographic dimension 
has mainly been taken into account in line 
with the ownership issue (franchisee versus 
company-owned retail unit). Some works 
deal with the link between location choice 
and the franchise chain’s life cycle. Julian 
and Castrogiovanni (1995) and Ehrmann 
and Meiseberg (2011) address the relation-
ship between location choice and franchise 
chain expansion, which is very close to our 
own focus. While Julian and Castrogiovanni 
(1995) study the role of franchisor capabili-
ties in geographical expansion, Ehrmann and 
Meiseberg (2011) analyze site selection in 
chain expansion and performance outcome 
at the franchisee level. In this seminal work, 
the authors address the impact of exogenous 
location factors versus endogenous network 
characteristics in site selection, while we aim 
at filling the gap regarding the issue “con-
centration of outlets versus dispersion” as 
franchisor’s entrepreneurial decision. Finally, 
the background empirical literature provides 
clear evidence on the noticeable impact of 
location on retail performance, but also high-
lights the complexity of this relationship, jus-
tifying thus further research.
We build on the extant evidence by ad-
dressing the case of a continent-sized country, 
Brazil, in a very dynamic context for fran-
chising, with rapid expansion of franchise 
systems. We study the different options open 
to the franchisor, from which we distinguish 
several profiles in addition to the performance 
outcomes.
In line with the few extant empirical works 
on the geographical dimension of franchised 
chain expansion (Ehrmann and Meiseberg 
2011; Julian and Castrogiovanni 1995), we 
study the location choice as a strategy of 
the entrepreneur-franchisor. This sums up a 
more complex reality, as outlet locations can 
be franchisee-suggested, and not necessar-
ily chosen by the franchisor. For simplicity, 
and to focus on the performance issue, we 
assume that all the bargaining power is on 
the franchisor side. Thus, the franchise system 
location choice is understood as a franchisor 
decision.
There are five reasons for our interest in 
the Brazilian market. First, as highlighted by 
Fadairo and Lanchimba 2017), very few studies 
deal with franchising in Latin America.1 Second, 
Brazil is one of the main emerging economies 
of the 21st century, forming part of the BRICS 
alongside Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa. Our paper thus adds to the developing 
literature on franchising in emerging countries 
(e.g., Grünhagen, Dant, and Zhu 2012). One 
commonality among the BRICS is their physi-
cal scale: being effectively continent-sized, this 
raises issues of spatial inequalities and agglom-
eration phenomena in economic development 
(e.g., Cheong and Wu 2014; Lessmann 2014). 
Third, despite the economic and political crisis 
affecting this “giant,” franchising in Brazil con-
tinues to grow. Although in 2016 Brazilian retail 
sales fell by 6.2% compared to 2015, and the 
sector ended with a fall of 4.3%, correspond-
ing to the worst result of the historical series 
beginning in 2001 and marking two consecu-
tive years of losses (Gaier and Moreira 2017), 
franchising was able to maintain its historical 
growth trend. Indeed, in the middle of one of 
the most challenging moments for the Brazilian 
economy, franchising recorded a growth of 
8.3% in 2016 (ABF 2016). Fourth, this growth 
movement is particularly driven by small and 
medium-sized local chains2—indeed, this is the 
essence of franchising in Brazil. Finally, fran-
chise chains are present in diverse regions of 
this huge country, including the most remote 
and least developed (Appendix 1), although 
Brazilian Southeast, the richest region in the 
country, remains the largest hub of franchise 
chains, with a 70.9% share in 2016 (ABF 2016).
Those five remarks together give us strong 
evidence that, even more than elsewhere, spa-
tial issues in Brazilian franchising as well as the 
related market opportunities are a crucial topic 
for research.
Although retail markets are “highly complex 
and dynamic” (Larsson and Öner 2014, p. 387), 
starting from this broad geographic picture we 
aim to identify the different profiles of loca-
tional choices in Brazilian franchising—that is, 
the different ways to exploit spatial opportuni-
ties—and to study the performance outcomes. 
For example, a new chain may choose to ex-
pand by exploiting the potential of this spatially 
extensive market and avoiding competition with 
the established big brands; this involves an en-
trepreneurial strategy based on the dispersion 
of the chain outlets, positioned in areas where 
they benefit from a local monopoly. From a sur-
vey of the literature, we first highlight relevant 
theoretical results on location choices and spa-
tial competition in retailing. On this basis, we 
empirically distinguish “behavior categories” of 
franchise chains in Brazil, referring to Porter’s 
“strategic groups” (1980), defined as sets of 
firms in an industry that display similar entre-
preneurial profiles, and to Meyer et al.’s “con-
figurations” (1993), relating to groups of firms 
with a common organizational profile. This 
concept of behavior categories regarding loca-
tional choices allows us to classify, by means of 
a two-step cluster analysis, the ways the sample 
chains exploit geographic entrepreneurial op-
portunities. To this end, we use a unique and 
recent panel data set containing valuable infor-
mation on geographical location. The study vari-
ables for the empirical analysis are derived from 
the literature on retailing and location choices. 
Finally, our econometric estimations relate 
chain behavior categories in location choices to 
performance outcomes at the franchisee level. 
Additional estimates allow us to study the im-
pact of each component of the geographic en-
trepreneurial choice to performance results.
1A statement that is true both in general and for Brazilian franchising in particular. Exceptions to the 
Brazilian case could be considered to fall onto two main axes: the contractual mix (a field starting with 
Azevedo and Silva 2007, 2001) and the internationalization of Brazilian networks (see, for instance, Camargo, 
Rocha, and Silva 1991). Locational choice nevertheless remains an open avenue to be explored. A single 
exception in Brazil seems to be Porto Sales (2014), although it is important to point out that, in this case, 
Porto Sales limited her study to a spatial snapshot of franchising in Latin America, including Brazil, and 
does not discuss the impact of the location decision on the performance of the franchising chains. The latter 
is our particular interest in this paper.
2According to the ABF definition, small franchising chains consist of 1 to 50 outlets, and medium- 
sized chains of 50 to 100 units. Of course, the big brands, with more than 100 units, stand out in the market, 
but a careful analysis of the Brazilian market reveals the dynamism of small chains (Silva and Azevedo, 
2010). Our full sample consists of franchising chains operating in Brazil (ABF data). The mean size is 85.41 
outlets. The distinction between local and foreign brands is instructive: the average size of foreign chains 
is 232.85 outlets, while the average size of Brazilian chains is only 78.98 outlets. The market is dominated 
by local brands (98.8%).
The paper is organized as follows. The 
next section presents the background liter-
ature and the hypotheses, identifying the 
relevant locational options for multi-outlet 
chains. The following section describes the 
data, and provides information on data col-
lection, the study variables, and summary 
statistics. The cluster analysis and estimations 
are presented, respectively, in the sections 
that follow. The last section concludes with 
final remarks and implications for entrepre-
neurship and academic studies that go be-
yond the Brazilian case.
Related Literature and 
Hypotheses Development
The literature contains several important 
studies which relate entrepreneurial choices, 
characterized by the construction of groups of 
franchise chains (clusters of franchise chains), 
to performance outcomes: notably Carney and 
Gedajlovic (1991), Combs and Ketchen (1999), 
Combs, Ketchen, and Hoover (2004), and 
Gonzalez-Diaz and Solis-Rodriguez (2017). As 
Combs and Ketchen (1999) remark, clusters 
can be derived either inductively or theoret-
ically. We give priority to the second option, 
where the variables used for the clustering 
process are related to the background litera-
ture and hypotheses deriving therefrom. Given 
the importance of location as an entrepreneur-
ial choice, a vast literature has developed deal-
ing with consumer spatial behavior and retail 
location. The aim of this analytical section is 
not to review this wide research field, but to 
highlight the theoretical results relevant to dis-
tinguishing behavior categories in the location 
choices of franchised chains in Brazil. These 
categories will be used, finally, to test the cen-
tral prediction, according to which:
H0: The location entrepreneurial choice is a 
key determinant of the chain performance.
In the following, based on the background 
literature, we discuss the determinants of 
the location entrepreneurial choice, and why 
they may impact the chain performance. 
A first determinant regards the method of 
allocation of chain outlets in space, corre-
sponding to the fundamental choice “ag-
glomeration versus dispersion,” that we 
present hereafter.
“Choosing to Stay”… The Benefits of 
Agglomeration
Spatial competition, where customer behav-
iors are influenced by the cost of transporta-
tion and the relative locations of buyers and 
sellers, can give rise to a variety of retail loca-
tion patterns. Agglomeration of retail outlets 
is one of the most relevant. Indeed, contrary 
to the a-spatial competition of standard micro-
economics models, spatial competition has mo-
nopolistic features leading to agglomeration.
In this analytical context, Hotelling’s (1929) 
pioneering contribution analyzes the way firms 
choose their location in a strategic environ-
ment, and formally demonstrates the benefits 
of agglomeration. Modeling a duopoly situa-
tion where, from fixed locations in a bounded 
linear market, companies sell identical prod-
ucts, Hotelling shows that the equilibrium 
corresponds to a situation of agglomeration 
of outlets. Firms are clustered in the center 
of the space, guaranteeing themselves a max-
imum market share. Thus modeled, duopolistic 
competition leads to price stability and is char-
acterized by the principle of minimum differ-
entiation of location decisions. This theoretical 
result is consistent with Smithies (1941) and 
Hartwick and Hartwick (1971).
Relaxing Hotelling’s hypotheses in order 
to study various market types and various lo-
cation conjectures, further theoretical studies 
have highlighted the limits of this result (e.g., 
d’Aspremont, Gabszewick, and Thisse 1979; 
Brown 1989; Mulligan and Fi 1994; Pitts and 
Boardman 1998). More particularly, without 
the hypothesis of demand inelasticity, the clus-
ter of retailers at the midpoint of the market 
does not display a price–spatial equilibrium, 
i.e., firms do not cluster together in the man-
ner suggested by Hotelling when demand is 
elastic. Indeed, clustering with price-elasticity 
of demand by spatially distributed consumers 
is not a stable option, as slight variations in 
pricing decisions can capture the entire market 
for one seller.
Nevertheless, the principle of minimum dif-
ferentiation remains unavoidable in the theory 
of retail location, with an enduring impact on 
the analysis of agglomeration phenomena of 
economic activities (Thisse 2011). Specifically, 
it is firmly associated with the agglomeration 
of similar outlets, which is relevant when an-
alyzing location entrepreneurial choice within 
a franchising chain. Moreover, Hotelling’s 
restrictive hypotheses of product homogeneity 
and demand inelasticity are appropriate in the 
case of the intra-brand spatial competition of 
franchisees. Indeed, within a chain, goods and 
concepts are standardized, with a price that 
tends to be uniform for each product whatever 
the retail outlet and location.3 This situation 
limits the issue of price competition and de-
mand elasticity in spatial competition.
An additional argument for the clustering of 
similar outlets emerges with the introduction 
in the analysis of uncertainty and risk-reducing 
behavior (Brown 1989). Retail agglomeration 
indeed reduces the search costs for imper-
fectly informed customers through comparative 
shopping (Ghosh and McLafferty 1987); Chung 
and Kalnins 2001). More generally, the advan-
tages of proximity, related to various forms of 
increasing returns as regards production, distri-
bution, and consumption, explain the observed 
strong tendency for geographical concentra-
tion (Fujita and Thisse 2002). Combes and 
Gobillon (2015) summarize the achievements 
of the vast empirical literature on agglomera-
tion economies. Agglomeration economies are 
a specific type of externalities. The latter con-
cept—externalities—relates to interactions be-
tween economic agents or entities. From the 
early work of Marshall (1920), the concept of 
externalities occupies a major place in the jus-
tification of the location of economic activities. 
Agglomeration economies, more specifically, 
include any effect that increases the firm’s per-
formance when the size of the local economy—
or the local network—grows. Combes and 
Gobillon thus distinguish static and dynamic 
mechanisms behind agglomeration economies: 
sharing effects, relating to the common use of 
local indivisible goods and facilities, and to the 
pooling of risk; matching effects, which cor-
respond to improvement of either the quality 
or the quantity of matches between firms and 
workers; and learning effects, which involve 
the generation, diffusion, and accumulation of 
knowledge. Sorenson and Søensen (2001) high-
light the importance of knowledge transfer and 
organizational learning in franchising chains, 
and underline the performance outcome.
Consistent with this analytical background 
emphasizing the advantages of agglomeration, 
we formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: Agglomeration of the chain outlets leads to 
higher performance.
“Choosing to Go” … The Benefits of 
Dispersion
As stated by Fujita and Thisse (2002), “the 
observed spatial configuration of economic ac-
tivities is the result of a complicated balance 
of two (opposing types of) forces” (p. 5), some 
working toward concentration, previously dis-
cussed, and the others toward dispersion. This 
interplay, highlighted by Lösch (1940), remains 
at the heart of locational phenomena, and can 
be reinterpreted as a trade-off between the in-
creasing returns associated with agglomeration 
economies, and mobility costs (Thisse 2011).
The transportation cost paid by distant 
customers is indeed an important argument 
for retail dispersion. Studying the relation-
ship between price and clustering, Hamilton, 
MacLeod, and Thisse (1991) provide an inter-
esting argument for the dispersion of retailers 
since geographical separation gives retail units 
greater market power over consumers located 
in their vicinity. This result is consistent with 
d’Aspremont, Gabszewick, and Thisse (1979, 
underscoring that the only stable location in 
a linear market is at the quartiles, where spa-
tial monopoly allows one retailer to capture 
the immediate market area, and contradicting 
Hotelling’s conclusion about a median loca-
tion. It is also consistent with the “nearest cen-
ter” hypothesis, postulated by classical central 
place theory (Lösch 1940; Christaller 2009; 
relevance of this theory has recently been 
restated by Larsson and Öner 2014), and ac-
cording to which customers necessarily shop 
at the closest store. Indeed, despite their sec-
ular decline, which has accelerated in recent 
3Like in the European Union and in the United States, and in accordance with the Brazilian law Nº 
12.529/2011, on the Brazilian market franchisors are not allowed to fix retail prices (formally).  However, as 
confirmed by the ABF, they usually suggest those prices, influencing thus the franchisees. The idea that 
prices tend to be uniform within a franchise chain is also supported by the results of Industrial Organization, 
a research field that studies market dynamics, and more precisely by the oligopoly theory. It is indeed rel-
evant to compare competition within a franchise chain to a market oligopoly. In that case, the most likely 
situation is a stable oligopoly, where competitors avoid a price war. Equilibrium is thus characterized by 
uniform prices (e.g., Tirole 2004).
decades, the impact of transport costs on the 
location of economic activities is still import-
ant—although this is a complex issue, as em-
phasized in the “New Economic Geography” 
(the seminal reference being Krugman 1991; 
see also Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999; 
Head and Mayer 2011; Ottaviano and Thisse 
2001).
A locational argument based on the mini-
mization of mobility costs for goods, people, 
and knowledge is meaningful in the case of a 
continent-sized country like Brazil. Moreover, 
the existence of agglomeration costs (Combes, 
Duranton, and Gobillon 2016) provides addi-
tional justification for the dispersion of retail 
locations. In the case of intra-brand compe-
tition, as within a franchise chain, the most 
important agglomeration cost is the risk of 
cannibalization.
The locational risk of cannibalization relates 
to spatial competition between geographically 
proximate retail outlets, where the presence 
of a new unit captures sales of other outlets. 
The spatial entrepreneurial choice of franchis-
ing chains, turning on the choice of where to 
locate their retail units, is affected by this can-
nibalization effect. This intra-chain competi-
tion effect may thus influence spatial choices 
as regards dispersion versus agglomeration. 
Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar (2012) estimate 
this cannibalization effect and provide evi-
dence for a significant decay in cannibalization 
with distance. In a context of chain expansion, 
they measure the net impact of a new store 
opening on the overall chain performance. This 
impact results from the joint and contradictory 
effect of incremental sales versus cannibaliza-
tion. Using econometrics and panel data to es-
timate the parameters of a demand model that 
captures spatial competition, they highlight a 
clear empirical link between cannibalization 
and distance.
As underlined by Ehrmann and Meiseberg 
(2011), who estimate cannibalization effects 
at the supra-regional level (which strongly de-
crease franchisee performances), situating new 
franchised outlets more remotely can be a suc-
cessful option.
Based on these analytical considerations, the 
following counter hypothesis is relevant:
H2: Dispersion of the chain outlets leads to 
higher performance.
Though the choice for agglomeration versus 
dispersion concerns the density of retail out-
lets, spatial entrepreneurial choices also deal 
with site selection decisions; in other words, 
with the choice to locate stores in a specific 
region or city.
“The Place to Be”… Inequalities across 
Locations
Moving from the which (i.e., the form of 
retail location) to the where (i.e., the location 
choice), we now go a step further concerning 
the determinants of the location entrepreneur-
ial choice, addressing the idea of inequali-
ties across locations, i.e., the idea that “some 
places do better than others” (Thisse 2011, p. 
142). This constitutes the main assumption of 
Chaudhuri, Ghosh, and Spell’s (2001) theoreti-
cal model on location in franchising.
Though gravity models underline the im-
portance of geographical distance, they also 
demonstrate that the attractiveness of a retail-
ing location, and therefore the choice to locate 
in a specific place, is not exclusively related 
to such distance. These models thus include a 
variety of other factors in the concept of at-
traction. Gravity models are derived from the 
laws of Newtonian physics. In this literature, 
Reilly (1931), Huff (1964), and Huff and Batsell 
(1977) have played a pioneering role. Reilly’s 
law of retail gravitation states that consumers 
trade-off the cost of travel to a retail outlet 
with the attractiveness of alternative shopping 
opportunities. More generally, gravitational 
models allow one to study attractiveness phe-
nomena and spatial interactions, bringing into 
consideration other attributes, in addition to 
distance, that are related to the potential of a 
local or regional area—such as demographic 
weight, gross domestic product, and socioeco-
nomic characteristics.
These models thus suggest that there are 
indeed differences in location quality. As em-
phasized by Ehrmann and Meiseberg (2011), 
who study site attractiveness for new fran-
chisees and the factors defining “a promising 
spot” (p. 95), this is true for location theory 
as a whole (Christensen and Drejer 2005; 
Craig, Ghosh, and McLafferty 1984; Ghosh and 
McLafferty 1982, 1987; Jones and Simmons 
1990; Kelly, Freeman, and Emlen 1993; Khan 
1999; Lee and McCracken 1982; Peterson 
2003; Simons 1992; Park and Khan 2006); 
and it is also the case for the New Economic 
Geography (Krugman 1991), which underlines 
the cumulative phenomena explaining loca-
tion in a specific place, related to increasing 
returns and externalities.
Finally, Ehrmann and Meiseberg (2011) and 
Larsson and Öner (2014) also underline spa-
tial characteristics, such as the economic size 
of the area, and demand accessibility, as ad-
ditional determinants of attractiveness, i.e., of 
store location.
In line with the above-presented analyses, 
we formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: Chains located in attracting areas—with a 
high population density and wealth—attain 
higher performance.
Data Set and Variables. We use recent panel 
data for the period 2009–2014, regarding 335 
franchise chains implanted in the Brazilian 
market. The sample franchise chains occupy 
1,397 Brazilian municipalities, and are pres-
ent in the 26 Brazilian states. Our unique data 
set compiles information from three distinct 
sources: (1) ABF’s Official Franchise Guides, 
(2) websites of franchise chains, and (3) Bra-
zilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE). In what follows, we present the data 
collection process and the study variables de-
rived from the analytical framework. We dis-
cuss the relevance of the sample, comparing 
it with the full population. Finally, we provide 
summary statistics.
Our first source is ABF’s Official Franchise 
Guide. This annual publication provides valu-
able information on the Brazilian franchise sec-
tor. We obtained data for the period 2009–2014. 
In order to achieve a better understanding of 
how ABF collected the information used to 
construct our data set, we performed inter-
views with executives from this organization: 
specifically, the president of ABF, his executive 
director, and his marketing analyst, who is re-
sponsible for both collecting and pooling in-
formation provided by the franchised chains. 
Divergent or even fake information could dam-
age the reputation of the chain, or make the 
search for potential franchisees more difficult. 
Therefore, there is a strong incentive for fran-
chising chains to offer good quality and up-
dated information.
The websites of the sample franchise chains 
comprise our second main source of informa-
tion. The manual capturing of website data was 
used to perform control checks, and to com-
plete the missing values from the ABF guides. 
In addition, we used this data source to collect 
spatial information regarding the zip codes of 
cities where the franchised chains are estab-
lished, in addition to the proportion of chain 
outlets operated in shopping malls. Where 
the chain websites were incomplete, we used 
PEGN, which is a Brazilian publication special-
ized on SMEs.
As our analysis requires localized data, we 
use a third source of information, the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). We 
collected information about georeferencing (lon-
gitude and latitude) of the municipalities where 
franchising chains are established, population, 
and the Human Development Index (HDI). The 
IBGE information comes from censuses con-
ducted in 1991, 2000, and 2010. Municipalities’ 
HDI data are also available from the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) website 
for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010.
We pooled the different sources of informa-
tion, performed crosschecks, and matched the 
data in order to stabilize the final sample com-
prising the required information for our empir-
ical analysis. Finally, as not all Brazilian chains 
are associated with the ABF, we controlled for 
the bias in our sample as compared to the fran-
chise chain population in Brazil. For each of 
the 11 sectors distinguished by ABF taxonomy,4 
we tabulated data regarding the total income 
of the sector, the number of chains, and the 
number of outlets (company-owned and fran-
chised), in 2014.
Next, we present the variables used in the 
empirical estimations, and in the cluster analy-
sis employed to determine behavior categories 
in the spatial entrepreneurial choices of fran-
chising chains in Brazil.
Performance Outcome Variables
The chain average monthly income per 
outlet divided by the chain average store area 
(m2) is the dependent variable in our econo-
metric models. To construct this variable, 
we collected the information for the chain 
4Advertising, Informatics & Electronics; Business, Services & Other Retails; Cars; Cleaning; Clothes; 
Education; Food; Hoteling & Tourism; House & Building; Shoes & Accessories; Sports, Health, Beauty & 
Leisure.
average monthly income per outlet, and for 
the chain average store area (m2), available 
in the ABF Franchising Guide, from 2009 to 
2014.
Location Entrepreneurial Choice
The chain location entrepreneurial choice is 
the core explanatory variable in our first set 
of estimations. We construct this variable with 
a two-step cluster analysis, using the location 
variables5 presented hereafter.
Variables of Interest
Four explanatory variables are directly re-
lated to our hypotheses:
Chain geographic dispersion. This variable is 
based on the geographic location of the chain 
outlets. First, we surveyed the addresses of 
all the sample chain outlets in 2011 and 2014. We 
thus created two specific data sets containing in-
formation regarding the Brazilian municipalities 
where the franchising chains are established. 
Then we georeferenced the cities where the 
stores are located, getting their latitude and their 
longitude. To construct the chain geographic 
dispersion variable, we used the software R, spe-
cifically the GEOCODE function of the package 
GGMAP (these artifacts are available at the Com-
prehensive R Archive Network [CRAN]). GEO-
CODE uses Google Maps to georeference the 
addresses entered in the data set.
On this basis, we constructed geographic 
clusters for each chain, grouping together 
stores located in the same area. Each geo-
graphic cluster is thus an area of agglomera-
tion of chain outlets. We defined the center for 
each geographic cluster so that the cumulative 
distance between the stores and the cluster 
center is the smallest possible.6 The distance 
criterion is the Euclidean distance based on the 
latitude and the longitude of the cities where 
each store is located. For example, assuming 
that a store A is located at the point (xA, yA) 
and a store B is located at the point (xB, yB), the 
Euclidean distance between them is defined as 
follows: D(A,B)=
√
((xA−xB)
2+ (yA−yB)
2). The 
Euclidean formula applies only to metric geo-
graphical coordinate systems. Thus, it underes-
timates the true distance that would be traveled 
by a road connecting the two points. This bias 
is greater at points distant from each other. 
However, alternative measures of distance, tak-
ing into account infrastructures, were not avail-
able: the Euclidian distance was the best and 
most intuitive proxy available.
Our variable, the chain geographic dispersion, 
is measured for each chain as the distance be-
tween the outlets within each geographic cluster 
of the chain, to which we add the distance be-
tween the centroïds of the different geographic 
clusters of the chain, divided by the number of 
outlets. In summary, then, for each chain:
(1) We performed georeferencing for each 
city where the outlets are located;
(2) We divided the chain into different geo-
graphic clusters based on the outlet 
locations;
(3) We calculated the distances between cities 
within each geographic cluster;
(4) We calculated the distances between the 
centroids of the geographic clusters;
(5) We summed the distances between cities 
and distances between the centroids;
(6) We divided the total distance by the num-
ber of outlets.
Percentage of chain outlets located in shopping 
malls. Jointly with the outlet addresses, we 
also captured whether the store is located in 
some kind of shopping mall. Thus, for each 
chain in our sample, we are able to define the 
proportion of outlets located in shopping cen-
ters, as a percentage.
Weighted average HDI of the chain location 
areas. The Human Development Index (HDI) 
is a socioeconomic indicator developed 
by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) in the early 90s to measure the socio-
economic development of countries and their 
constituent units (states, provinces, munici-
palities, etc.). This multidimensional indica-
tor goes beyond purely economic issues, and 
in addition captures aspects related to public 
health and education. Moreover, given its syn-
thetic character, the index allows one to es-
tablish a ranking and, as a result, permits a 
6To split the data and to determine the appropriate number of geographic clusters for each chain, we 
used the “R” package “NbClust” and the “Kmeans” R function.
5Chain geographic Dispersion, Percentage of chain outlets in shopping malls, Mean HDI of the chain 
location areas, Chain age, Chain-size, Percentage of company owned-unit, Brand value.
certain comparability between countries and 
regions. More precisely, the HDI compiles three 
indexes relating to distinct socioeconomic 
dimensions: health of the population, measured 
in years as the life expectancy at birth; educa-
tion of the population, measured by mean of 
years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and 
more, and expected years of schooling for chil-
dren of school entering age; income of the pop-
ulation, i.e., the standard of living measured 
by the gross national income (GNI) per capita. 
More precisely, the HDI uses the logarithm of 
income to reflect the diminishing importance of 
income with increasing GNI. In addition, the 
GNI per capita is adjusted to the local cost of liv-
ing to make it comparable across countries and 
regions, through the methodology known as 
purchasing power parity. It is expressed in US 
dollars (index base 100). The HDI is the geo-
metric mean of the three-dimensional indices.
In our study, we use a localized HDI. The 
IBGE provides information regarding the HDI 
for each Brazilian state and municipality. Since 
its inception in the early 90s, this localized HDI 
has been recorded three times (1990, 2000, and 
2010). In our empirical analysis, we use the 
index calculated by the UNDP in 2010. More 
precisely, our study variable is the weighted 
average HDI of cities where the chain is estab-
lished. We use as weight the number of stores 
per town.7 Thus, this variable represents the 
mean HDI of the chain location.
Weighted average population of the chain loca-
tion areas. Approximately every 10 years, the 
IBGE implements a population census on be-
half of the Brazilian government, with the last 
three censuses conducted in 1991, 2000, and 
2010. Out of this period, the IBGE estimates the 
population per municipality by linearizing the 
trend indicated by the last two censuses. To cal-
culate the weighted average, we use the IBGE es-
timates for 2011 regarding the population of the 
cities where the sample chains were established, 
using the same procedure as with the HDI.
Control Variables
We include in our empirical analysis the fol-
lowing control variables:
Chain age, i.e., the age of the chain, that is 
the difference between the year of the first fran-
chised unit8 and each year in our panel. This 
variable is related to the influence of timing on 
location choice. Extant literature defends the 
idea that this entrepreneurial decision is asso-
ciated to the life cycle of the chain, in other 
words to its expansion stage. Indeed, the first 
firm to locate in a market can capture strategic 
sites. This first-mover advantage acts thus as a 
barrier to entry and delays the entry of new 
competitors by affecting their locational choices 
(Polo-Redondo, Bordonaba, and Palacios 
2011). Distinguishing competitive advantages 
at several stages of a franchise life, and study-
ing territorial expansion of franchised chains in 
geographically fragmented markets, Julian and 
Castrogiovanni (1995) develop the idea that 
when franchisors attempt to capitalize on the 
first-mover advantage by preempting the most 
desirable locations and saturating the market, 
locations are dispersed. Carney and Gedajlovic 
(1991) argue that the need for spatial preemp-
tion is particularly important when franchisors 
have innovative retail concepts. Finally, con-
sidering the short- and long-run incentives to 
franchise, and monitoring problems related to 
geographic dispersion, Martin and Justis (1993) 
explain the intensive use of franchising in the 
early growth stages, arguing that growth and 
preemptive strategies are more important for 
young franchisors. However, the alternative en-
trepreneurial choice may also hold some prom-
ise. Later entrants may have an advantage since 
they are better able to react to changing condi-
tions, as shown by Golder and Tellis (1993). For 
this reason, it is relevant to control for the age 
of the chain as a determinant of the location 
choice and its performance outcome.
Percentage of company owned-units, related 
to the proportion of company-owned units in 
the total of the chain outlets. Some work within 
the literature on franchising has related the lo-
cation choice to chain ownership structure. As 
previously mentioned, the issue of location is 
taken into account most often within agency 
theory, along with the related problem of mon-
itoring costs. The literature highlights free- 
riding behaviors in retail chains, and underlines 
7… the goal being to focus on the location choice effect and to allow comparisons between the chains, 
controlling for the chain size effect.
8Referring to the first franchised unit ever, not necessarily in the Brazilian market, by which the chain 
became a franchising chain.
the associated need for the headquarters to 
monitor the outlets (e.g., Lafontaine and Slade 
2001; Lal 1990; Michael 1999). Chain expansion 
and spatial dispersion increase the agency- 
monitoring problem (Carney and Gedajlovic 
1991). Because they are independent firms, 
franchisees are more likely to make significant 
efforts, thus requiring less monitoring. This sit-
uation would impact the ownership structure 
of retail chains, mixing strategically compa-
ny-owned units and franchised units as part of 
their location choices (Perryman and Combs 
2012). This argument finds empirical support 
in the econometric work on franchise data. 
Several studies (e.g., Combs and Ketchen 2003; 
Lafontaine 1992; Norton 1988) indeed provide 
evidence that outlets located close to head-
quarters are more likely to be company owned, 
while retail units in more distant locations are 
more likely to be franchised. Therefore, a clear 
link is established between spatial choices and 
the ownership structure of franchising chains.
Brand value: ABF yearbooks provide infor-
mation about a total of thirteen types of support 
that the associated franchisors offer to their 
franchisees. They are: legal support, plant and 
equipment selection, trading point selection, 
organization and methods, operation project, 
support for financing leverage, financing proj-
ect, promotional material, architectonic project, 
marketing project, advertising and promotion, 
training, and layout project. For every support, 
the information is available as a dummy vari-
able. Summing these categorical variables for 
each chain, we create the brand value variable 
as an ordered multinomial variable; 0 being the 
value for the chains with the lowest support of 
the franchisor to the franchisees, 13 represent-
ing the highest support. We obtain a proxy of 
the brand value, related to the franchisor’s effort. 
This proxy is based on the assumption that the 
franchisor’s involvement in the exploitation of 
the brand is directly related to the brand value, 
its promotion, and its protection regarding the 
potential free-riding of the franchisees. This as-
sumption finds analytical support in the agency 
literature in terms of bilateral moral-hazard 
(e.g., the seminal theoretical contribution of Lal 
1990) which emphasizes the role of the franchi-
sor in the bilateral franchise relationship.
Chain size: Measured as the number of out-
lets in the chain.
Sector dummies: We made the choice to use 
the official ABF classification of the franchising 
chains in Brazil to construct sector dummies. 
Detailed statistics regarding the features of the 
sectors distinguished in our study are available 
in the Online Appendix.
Foreign: We constructed an additional 
dummy variable to indicate whether chains op-
erating in Brazil have a Brazilian or a foreign 
headquarters.
ABF label: The ABF label “certification of 
excellence” is awarded to distinguish chains 
achieving a minimum level of satisfaction 
among its franchisees. This certification is 
based on a survey of the franchisees, conducted 
by ABF. The results are published annually in 
the Franchising Guide. Franchising chains that 
reach the specified satisfaction ratings are iden-
tified using the label. It is important to men-
tion that chains have to pay to be part of the 
contest. Franchisee satisfaction indexes include 
the overall chain performance (the franchisor 
quality in coordinating the whole chain), the 
brand performance with regard to profitability, 
and operating performance of the chain (class 
support to franchisees). We use a dummy vari-
able to indicate the chain situation during the 
period 2009–2014.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the means, standard devi-
ation, and correlation matrix. Because the 
presence of a few missing values may bias the 
estimations, we completed the data with the 
average values. Descriptive statistics indicate 
that the variables are quite homogenous in the 
sample, as shown by the means being higher 
than the standard deviations. The exceptions 
are the proportion of company-owned units, 
the chain geographic dispersion, and the per-
formance /m2, characterized by some degree 
of heterogeneity.
Behavior Categories in 
Spatial Entrepreneurial 
Choices
Methodology
In order to construct the variable location 
entrepreneurial choice, which will be the core 
explanatory variable in the first set of estima-
tions, we use a two-step cluster analysis.9 The 
 9The method is implemented in the software SPSS.
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aim of this statistical multivariate technique is 
to achieve the maximum intra-group homo-
geneity and the biggest inter-group heteroge-
neity. More precisely, the algorithm identifies 
groups of cases that exhibit similar response 
patterns. These cases are assigned to the clus-
ter with the nearest center. As mentioned in 
the method name, the algorithm contains two 
stages: pre-clustering and hierarchical cluster-
ing. The pre-cluster stage groups the chains 
into several small clusters. The hierarchical 
cluster stage uses the small clusters as input, 
and groups them into larger clusters. This 
method is appropriate to our goal and has sev-
eral advantages. First, categorical and contin-
uous variables can be included. In addition, 
the procedure determines the optimal num-
ber of clusters given the input variables, com-
paring the values of a model-choice criterion 
across different clustering solutions. Finally, 
the method allows us to control for the quality 
of the clustering process. As we use a panel 
data set, we consider each franchised chain for 
a specific year as a different individual in the 
other years. This way of proceeding enables us 
to capture changes in entrepreneurial choice 
over time.
Data Analysis and Features of the Three 
Behavior Categories
The clustering process allows us to distin-
guish three groups of franchising chains in 
Brazil. On the basis of descriptive statistics for 
each group, the following comments can be of-
fered to specify the three behavior categories.10
The first group, which we label concentrated 
beginner franchisors, contains the youngest 
chains (15.9 years), with a low geographic dis-
persion. These chains are established in cities 
with a moderate population and HDI. The fran-
chisors in this group have all almost immedi-
ately established franchised units. These chains 
are also characterized by a moderate presence 
in shopping malls. Regarding the contract de-
sign, these chains have royalty rates and upfront 
fees that are on average smaller as compared 
to the two other groups. We label the second 
group concentrated mature franchisors. This 
second category consists of older chains (27.1 
years), with a moderate geographic dispersion. 
This group is distinguished by a positive and 
significant relationship between the HDI and 
the total number of units. The units are located 
in cities with a high population. Further, the 
chains are mainly present in shopping malls. In 
this group, the presence in shopping malls is 
positively and significantly related to the roy-
alty rate. The reason for this correlation could 
be the strong brand name value, compared to 
the other two groups. The third group is la-
beled dispersed mature franchisors. The chains 
in this group have a high level of geographic 
dispersion, and are on average the oldest (29.78 
years) in the sample. The age is positively and 
significantly related to the number of cities 
where the chain is established. Furthermore, 
the number of cities where the chain is estab-
lished is significantly and negatively related 
to the percentage of company-owned units. 
This correlation is clearly higher compared 
to the other two groups. This seems to indi-
cate that the expansion experienced by these 
chains is strongly driven by franchising, which 
contradicts Martin and Justis’s (1993) analysis 
previously presented. Indeed, these authors 
predicted an intensive use of franchising for 
young franchisors.
From this analysis, two main discriminat-
ing variables are thus highlighted: chain geo-
graphic dispersion and chain age.
Performance Outcome of 
Spatial Entrepreneurial 
Choices
Methodology
Regarding the choice of the econometric 
models, we first use the panel data to compare 
the random effects model and the fixed effects 
model. Both of them address the problem of 
the unobserved heterogeneity by specifying 
an error term constant over time for each unit 
(fixed effects model) or randomly distributed 
over time for each unit (random effects model).
With short period panels, as with the sample, 
the random effects model may produce better es-
timators than the fixed effects model (Heckman 
1981). In addition, the random effects model is 
consistent in the presence of time-invariant vari-
ables (Greene 2000). This is not the case for the 
fixed effects model. Indeed, time-invariant vari-
ables can be perfectly collinear with the fixed 
effects, though most of the contract variables 
are by nature almost time-invariant.
10The descriptive statistics are available upon request.
The Hausman test confirms our intuition, 
and shows that the random effects model 
is more appropriate to the data. Additional 
checks are performed which confirm the pref-
erence for the random effects model. We use 
the Lagrange multiplier test to see if the vari-
ance across the franchised chains is zero: this 
test supports the random effects model since 
it provides evidence of significant differences 
across the chains.
Again using the Hausman test, we check for 
potential problems of endogeneity: the regres-
sors may indeed raise endogeneity problems 
because they are geographical characteristics 
concerning where the outlet is located, which 
derive from the franchisor’s own choice. We 
compare the previous results with an instru-
mental model including the lagged variable 
as an instrument. Our results show that there 
is no problem of endogeneity. In addition, we 
perform a likelihood-ratio test regarding het-
eroskedasticity at the panel level. The results 
confirm that the data in the sample do not have 
a common disturbance variance, thus providing 
another support for the random effects model. 
We also test for autocorrelation. The results 
show that we do have to deal with this problem.
To correct for heteroscedasticity and au-
tocorrelation, we use the generalized least 
squares (GLS) method. This method enables us 
to estimate the unknown parameters of a lin-
ear regression model. The GLS is applied when 
the variances of the observations are unequal 
(heteroscedasticity problem), and/or when 
there is a certain degree of correlation between 
the observations. It is well known that in both 
cases the ordinary least squares (OLS) method 
is statistically inefficient, and provides mislead-
ing inferences. Finally, we test if all year coeffi-
cients are not jointly equal to zero. The results 
show that the time-fixed effects are needed. 
The detailed results of the specification tests 
are available in the Online Appendix.
Estimation Results
Our first estimation results are reported 
in Table 2, and concern the influence of the 
variable location entrepreneurial choice, con-
structed with the two-step cluster analysis, 
on franchised chain performances. Thus, we 
study the distinct impact of the three behavior 
categories (concentrated beginner franchisors, 
concentrated mature franchisors, dispersed 
mature franchisors) captured by the variable 
location entrepreneurial choice on the chain 
average monthly income per outlet / m2. For 
each behavior category, we estimate a model 
without control variables, and one including 
the control variables, for robustness checks. 
As the variables chain size and brand value 
are used in the cluster analysis, we do not in-
clude them as controls in these first estima-
tions (Table 2).
We comment first on the good global sig-
nificance of the models, as highlighted by the 
Wald Chi2 tests. In addition, comparing the es-
timations of the models with and without con-
trol variables, we conclude that our results are 
robust.
The estimations show that the two control 
variables have a significant impact on the chain 
performance. Logically, a positive relationship 
is highlighted between ABF-labeled chains 
and performance. Headquarters’ nationality 
(Brazilian versus non-Brazilian) has also an ef-
fect on the chain performance.
The negative sign here indicates that chains 
with Brazilian headquarters are more likely to 
achieve higher performances, which could be 
explained by a better knowledge of the market.
However, the main result of this set of esti-
mations is the clear significant influence of the 
location entrepreneurial choice on the chain 
performance. This provides evidence for H0, 
according to which the location entrepreneur-
ial choice is a key determinant of the chain 
performance. Yet, depending on the behavior 
category, the impact of this choice on the perfor-
mance can be positive or negative. This invites 
us to go further in the estimation process to un-
derstand the logic behind these differentiated 
results. As the location entrepreneurial choice 
variable sums up several decisions and features 
of the franchised chain, we estimate additional 
models to study the individual impact of these 
decisions/features. The aim is to press the anal-
ysis further, based on complementary results.
In the additional estimations presented in 
Table 3, the regressors are the variables initially 
used to construct the location entrepreneurial 
choice variable (which is now removed from 
the models). For robustness checks, we esti-
mate models with and without year and sector 
dummies.
Here again, we obtain a good global signifi-
cance of the estimated models, and the results 
are robust. Concerning the control variables, 
the sign regarding the variables foreign and 
ABF label is consistent with preceding results. 
Though chain size has no significant influence, 
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chain age, proportion of company-owned units, 
and brand value favor the chain performance 
which stands to reason if interpreted as reputa-
tional effects and as effects of experience.
The significant and negative sign of the vari-
able chain geographic dispersion indicates that 
agglomeration favors chain performance. Thus, 
H2, related to the advantages of dispersion, is 
not supported, while the alternative hypothe-
sis, H1, according to which agglomeration of 
the chain outlets leads to higher performance, 
finds empirical evidence. This enlightens our 
previous result regarding the significant neg-
ative impact on chain performance to be part 
of the concentrated beginner franchisors cat-
egory (Table 2), suggesting that the negative 
sign is related to the young age of those chains.
The estimations presented in Table 3 also 
show that location in shopping centers sig-
nificantly and positively impacts chain perfor-
mance. In the same way, we obtain evidence 
that location in areas with a high HDI, or a 
Table 3
Performance Outcome of Spatial Entrepreneurial Choices (2)
(7)
Performance/m2
(8)
Performance/m2
Chain geographic dispersion −2.03** −9.78**
(1.08) (4.02)
Mean HDI of the chain loc. 
areas
2.404**
(1.270)
0.202**
(1.011)
Mean pop. of the chain loc. 
areas
6.40***
(1.14)
5.00***
(1.34)
% of chain outlets in shop. 
malls
1.769***
(0.0622)
1.045***
(0.0861)
Chain age 0.815*** 0.349**
(0.155) (0.159)
Chain size 0.225 0.215
(0.184) (0.158)
ABF label 0.0427** 0.0397**
(0.0226) (0.0231)
% of company-owned units 0.193*** 0.131**
(0.0544) (0.0566)
Foreign −0.264** −0.179**
(0.105) (0.051)
Brand name 0.883** 0.648**
(0.430) (0.312)
Sector dummies no yes
Year dummies no yes
Constant 1.116** 1.370*
(0.295) (0.110)
N 2010 2010
1066.59*** 1335.78***
Random effects models for the Chain average monthly income per outlet / m2 (models 7–8).
Standard errors in brackets –*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
high population, increases chain performance. 
These results provide strong empirical support 
for H3, emphasizing that chains located in at-
tracting areas—with a high population density 
and wealth—attain higher performance.
In sum, our study suggests that, in the out-
comes of location entrepreneurial choices of 
franchised chains in Brazil, the benefits of ag-
glomeration dominate the locational risks of 
cannibalization. This result appears at three 
levels: first, regarding the impact of spatial al-
location choices within the Brazilian territory; 
second, regarding the impact of location in 
cities with a high population density and 
wealth; and finally, inside the cities, regarding 
the impact of establishing in areas with high 
business intensity such as shopping malls.
Conclusion
Contribution and General Findings
In this paper, we study location choice, one 
of the most important entrepreneurial deci-
sions in building up franchise chains. Location 
is paramount, as it defines the access to and 
attraction of large numbers of customers, thus 
impacting both on market share and profitabil-
ity. However, despite the extensive literature in 
economics and in retailing on location choices, 
few studies in the franchise literature have 
been dedicated to this subject. This gap is par-
adoxical since decisions regarding geograph-
ical expansion are essential to the success of 
franchise chains.
We address the particular context of 
Brazilian franchising. In recent years, franchis-
ing in this continent-sized country has experi-
enced a vertiginous process of expansion, with 
chains extending to more diverse and remote 
regions. Though statistics reveal that there is 
much scope for franchising to expand on the 
Brazilian continent, little is known about the 
locational risks—in other words, about how the 
exploitation of geographic entrepreneurial op-
portunities impacts on performance outcomes. 
To deal with this issue, we first survey the rele-
vant literature on location decisions and spatial 
competition in retailing to identify hypotheses 
regarding the potential determinants of the 
chain choices. On this basis, we conduct an 
empirical analysis on a new, recent, and unique 
panel data set compiling information from 
three complementary sources, and containing 
geographical data. With a two-step cluster anal-
ysis, we compile information related to location 
decisions in Brazilian franchising. We thereby 
distinguish several typical profiles in the en-
trepreneurial decision of franchising chains in 
Brazil. These locational choices are then sub-
mitted to econometric estimations in order to 
derive performance outcomes. Our results em-
phasize the robust impact of location choice 
on chain performance, measured at the outlet 
level, thus having significant implications for 
entrepreneurship in the case of multi-outlet 
chains, as well as for academic research.
Implications for Entrepreneurship
The aforementioned remarkable expansion 
of franchising in Brazil has in a sense occurred 
“in the dark,” especially when considering that 
small and medium-sized companies—which 
are the essence of franchising in Brazil—do 
not have market intelligence centers, unlike 
large chains. In this context, the entrepreneur-
ial “should I stay or should I go”11 decision, 
which should properly be resolved by refer-
ence to both empirical and relational data, is 
often made in a passive way—that is, “I go 
where they want me to”12—and not based on 
documented strategic analyses in the way one 
would expect. These human and monetary 
constraints characterize small and medium 
multi-outlet chains; for this reason, this issue 
is not just restricted to the Brazilian context. It 
is in fact relevant for small and medium fran-
chising chains in general.
With this in mind, our study highlights some 
useful aspects to help franchise chains in their 
decision regarding geographic entrepreneurial 
choices. First, we provide strong evidence that 
in the Brazilian context, geographic expansion 
choices by multi-unit chains are not neutral in 
terms of performance, taking into account the 
average monthly income per outlet and per 
store area. This result emphasizes the relevance 
of four determinants of location entrepreneur-
ial choice in franchising, which emerge from 
the background literature: the choice for ag-
glomeration of chain outlets versus dispersion 
in space; the choice for a specific region or city, 
related to the socioeconomic features of the 
11As the English punk rock band The Clash sung in the early 1980s.
12“Me” representing different contextual hazards.
area; the choice for a preemption strategy to 
get a first-mover advantage, related to the chain 
age; and the ownership structure of the chain.
Despite the opportunities presented by such a 
huge country, we show that agglomeration leads 
to higher performance in Brazilian franchising. 
For the franchisors, agglomeration refers to the 
choice to “stay” instead of trying to reach dis-
tant places; that is, to implant franchised outlets 
in the same geographic area. In a context char-
acterized by “a large expansion of franchising 
opportunities, beyond the capital and big cities” 
(Duarte 2014), this is a surprising result.
This also means that franchisees should 
not fear the locational risks related to canni-
balization effects, associated with the spatial 
intra-brand competition. We obtain evidence 
suggesting that the positive effect of agglom-
eration—for example, related to brand repu-
tation—surpasses the negative cannibalization 
effects of agglomeration, and the positive spa-
tial monopoly effects of dispersion.
Nevertheless, even though, based on our re-
sults, we defend the idea that agglomeration 
provides higher performance, this has to be 
nuanced by a recognition that this is not the 
case everywhere. Space is not neutral, and we 
observe a positive impact of high population 
and high development index on performance 
outcomes at the franchisee level. As a related 
managerial implication, franchisors should 
focus their chain development on big agglom-
erations, despite the large size of the country, 
and not prioritize less crowded places.
Limitations and further research. This study 
is not without limitations, themselves opening 
routes for further research.
First, our conclusions in terms of perfor-
mance outcomes only hold for revenues; we did 
not take into account the profit implications. 
Second, though the results are robust to sector 
dummies, more in-depth analyses could high-
light contrasting decisions, depending on the 
industry. In addition, we emphasize the value 
of agglomeration (the choice to “stay”), but the 
right entrepreneurial choice certainly differs at 
different stages of the chain age. A more de-
tailed analysis of the timing of the decision may 
be fruitful. Our empirical work ignores the po-
tential impact of exclusive territories clauses 
in franchise contracts. This information is not 
available at the moment via ABF, as franchis-
ing chains are reluctant to provide it. Regarding 
this constraint, a qualitative analysis focus-
ing on a selected number of chains agreeing 
to cooperate with the researchers could deal 
with this issue and complement our results 
on secondary data. As previously mentioned, 
the Euclidian distance used to construct the 
geographic dispersion variable was the best 
and most intuitive measure available; yet this 
measure overlooks the impact of infrastruc-
tures. Finally, further research could develop 
international comparisons (for instance with 
other BRICS) to see if our main results regard-
ing the geographic entrepreneurial choices of 
franchised chains hold in different institutional 
contexts and transportation infrastructures.13
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Appendix 2
Figure A1 
Spatial Allocation of Franchising In Brazil
Authors generated from ABF (2016), IBGE (2017), and UNDP (2017) data
